regarding "world capital market integration" must be revised with the rightful presence of capital goods prices The paper also offers some tentative assessments of the capital goods price impact on accumulation and growth, and explores some possible demand-side and supply-side determinants of the relative price of capital goods. We conclude with an agenda for the future.
The Data
Capital goods price indices underlie the real investment series of all national accounts, and in some cases machinery or equipment price indices are available separately. We have drawn on these national accounts price series for eleven countries to construct a database covering Australia, Canada, Demnark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States.4 For each country a relative price index can be formed by dividing the capital goods price index by the consumption goods price index.5 The resulting series tell us how this relative price (PkIPc) has changed over time within each country, but they do not tell us anything about differences between countries: we can say with certainty that the relative price of capital goods fell in Japan and rose in the US from the 1870s to the 195 Os, but so far we cannot say whether the relative price of capital goods in the US was higher or lower than it was in Japan at any time over the eight decades. To establish a cross-country benchmark for 1950, we use the price level variables for investment and consumption reported by the Penn World Tables for each country.6 The We would like to expand the sample, but most countries do not have long and detailed national accounts stretching back to the 19th century.
Consumption goods are chosen for the comparison rather than the overall GDP deflator because the investment goods index is included in the GDP deflator. Using Gordon's (1990) postwar data for the US, Greenwood, Hcrcowitz and Krusell (1997) as well as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1998) also relate capital goods prices to consumption goods prices. Jones (1994, p. 361) shows that the choice does not matter for the period. Later in this paper, we also relate capital goods prices to wage rates, a relative price of men versus machines that motivates capital deepening. 6 The 1950 figures are themselves linked to benchmarks constructed by the United Nations' International Comparison Program which was initiated in 1970 and extended in 1975 , 1980 , and 1985 (Summers and Heston 1991 . benchmark permits a double comparison similar to that made by Charles Jones (1994) : we observe whether the price of capital goods relative to the price of consumption goods in a particular country is high or low compared to the same ratio in other countries. Thus, we can say something about the relative cost of capital goods between countries as well as over time.
Unfortunately, the Penn World Tables do not provide price series for the sub-components of capital goods, and at the same time it is evident that producer durables prices may differ substantially from the overall capital goods price. This implies that the 1950 PWT figures for overall investment goods prices are probably not reliable approximations of equipment or machinery prices. Instead, we take the producer durables and consumer goods price data from the U.N.'s International Comparison Program (ICP) for 1980 and extend these prices back to 1950 by using the producer durables and consumer goods price indices implicit in the OECD national accounts.
Admittedly, this is not an ideal measure of relative capital goods prices over time or across countries, as Simon Kuznets pointed out long ago (Kuznets 1961, p. 15) . The national accounts capital goods price series are often combinations of input prices rather than actual observations of capital goods prices -that is, they often ignore productivity advance within the capital goods sector. Furthermore, the methods of price estimation are not identical across countries, and so we cannot even hope that the biases work the same way and to the same extent in every country. Finally, using a single benchmark to anchor time series running back to 1870 could, of course, produce misleading comparisons.7 The farther we travel from the benchmarks, the less certain our estimates become. Nevertheless, Robert J. Gordon, after employing similar national accounts price series almost forty years ago, observed that "To deny the existence of these differential price trends is to deny the validity of the deflated estimates of the components of GNP on which we all so heavily rely" (1961, p. 937) . It is no surprise that historical national accounts data are quite imperfect, and so it is clear that we See Nuxoll (1994) and Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) for considerations of the problems associated with intertemporal and international price data. must proceed with caution. At the same time, it seems foolish to postpone the exploration of potentially important determinants of long-term economic growth simply because the data are not ideal. Until the next round of revision of historical national accounts (and their underlying price series) and the appearance of comprehensive cross-country capital goods price data for the 19th century, the comparisons we make here rely on the best available characterizations of each economy's evolution.
The Evolution of the Relative Price of Capital Goods 1870 -1950 Tables 1 a and lb document the movements in capital goods prices relative to consumption goods prices over eighty years, country by country, with each series set equal to 100 in 1900. The first notable fact is the time series variety across countries. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States all exhibit a rising relative cost of capital goods between the 1870s and just prior to World War I. Some of these increases are quite marked: the Swedish relative price rose 17.5 percent, the Danish by 14.4 percent, the Canadian by 11.7 percent, and the US by 10.6 percent. If the price elasticity of investment demand was about unity, these relative price changes would, by themselves, have served to choke off real investment in these economies anywhere between a tenth and a sixth by the end of the period.
Had those relative prices been constant, annual investment in those four decades just prior to World War I would have been quite a bit higher.
Other countries underwent a decline in the relative price of capital goods. Japan experienced a spectacular fall of 46 percent, much of which took place during the 1870s and 1880s, an event which must certainly have stimulated accumulation there.8 Although not as spectacular as Japan, other countries underwent a decline up to 1910-1914 too: Germany by 19.2 percent, Italy by 8.3 percent and the United Kingdom by 7.9 percent. That these four countries recorded a significant decline in relative capital goods prices is all the more surprising given that the late 19th century investment boom was raising investment shares in GDP almost everywhere in the world economy. These demand-side forces should have tended to raise relative capital goods prices, suggesting that strong cost-reducing supply side forces must have been at work in the capital goods sector in each of these four countries. The decline in the relative price of equipment (Table ib) was even more dramatic in all four countries: between 1870/74 and 19 10/14 the relative price of machines in Japan fell by more than 66 percent; in Germany by 36 percent; in Italy by almost 12 percent; and in the UK by more than 17 percent. Indeed, every country in our sample experienced a decline in the relative price of equipment over the period, even though in some cases the aggregate capital goods price was on the rise.
The second notable fact is the regime switch around World War I. That is, the ubiquitous and strong downward drift in the relative price of equipment leveled out in all but one case and even started rising in some. Between the early 1920s and 1950, the relative price of equipment rose in Denmark, Norway, the UK and the US. In Canada, Japan and Sweden, the late 19th century fall in the relative price of equipment slowed down markedly, and in Germany the decline ceased entirely. Only in Italy did the pre-WWI decline resume its rapid rate of fall after the 1920s.
The third notable fact is that the Great Depression and the two World Wars, which one might expect to have had quantitatively different demand-side effects on the prices of capital goods and consumer goods, appear not to have had a large impact on the relative price of capital goods or equipment.9 Since investment contracted so much more than did consumption during the Great Depression, one would have expected those demand effects to have lowered the relative price of capital goods. Although the relative price of capital goods fell slightly in a number of countries from the late 1920s to the early 1930s (and more than slightly in Germany), only in Italy and Germany did this relative decline persist into the late 1930s. Similarly, only in Italy did the relative price of equipment fall from the late 1 920s into the late 1 930s. This result cannot be explained by some exceptional stickiness of capital goods prices since they dropped enormously into the Great Depression, but less so than did the price of consumption goods. The examination of price trends during wartime is a bit obscured because some countries drop out of the sample during the wars. As the demand for military hardware rose, presumably the prices of factors and materials used intensively in the production of capital goods (especially private producers durables) also increased. This should have raised the prices of capital goods relative to others in the economy. This appears to have been true everywhere In the benchmark year of 1950, only Germany and Finland had lower relative capital goods prices than the United States (Table 2a) and only Canada had lower relative equipment prices (Table 2b ). Despite '°T he exception being Australia in World War II when the relative price of capital goods rose from 107.85 in 1935-39 to 122.78 in 1940-44. Japan's spectacular capital goods price decline up to World War II, it still had a much higher relative price than the US in 1950, 75.3 percent higher. Ceteris paribus (and ignoring international capital mobility for a moment), Japan would have required a savings rate 75 percent higher than the US to make the same real investment in its productive capacity. Thus, Japan's historically high savings rate has had to compensate for the relative high price of capital goods there compared to other countries. Over the eighty years as a whole, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the UK appear to have had relatively expensive capital goods implying, ceteris paribus, a relatively disadvantageous price structure for capital accumulation. Japan, Sweden and the UK in particular carried the heaviest burdens. Finland, Germany, Norway and the US appear to have had relatively cheap capital goods implying, ceteris paribus, a favorable price structure for capital accumulation.
The relative price of equipment declined in each of the nine sampled countries up to World War I, but the decline was much steeper in some than others. Those with the most expensive equipment in the 1 870s enjoyed the steepest relative price decline up to World War I, just as one would expect for tradable goods in an increasingly global economy. The between-country spread in relative prices in the late 1 870s was far larger than just prior to World War I. In the 1870s, the relative price of equipment in Japan and Italy was 7.9 and 3.0 times that of the United States, but those ratios had fallen to 3.0 and 2.8 by World War I.
Throughout the eight decades, the United States and Canada maintained the lowest relative prices of machinery.
The Evolution of a Global Capital Market?
In measuring the evolution of a global financial market over the past century, Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor (1998) point out that the dispersion of real interest rates for ten countries fell slightly between 1885 and 1914, jumped up during World War I, declined somewhat during the 1920s, increased again during the 1930s achieving a secular peak in the mid-1940s, and then declined sharply from that peak to 1960.
Despite the ballyhooed financial "globalization" of the 1980s and 1990s, the dispersion of interest rates across these countries has not changed much since the 1960s (Obstfcld and Taylor 1998, p. 366) 11 The dispersion of real interest rates after 1960 was similar in magnitude to its level prior to 1914, despite the dislocation of the interwar years. Hence the now standard view about the timing and extent of international (financial) capital market integration asserts that global capital markets were as well integrated in 1914 as they are now and that what had been gained up to 1914 was lost during the de-globalization episode up to the 1940s. So much for intcrest rates and financial markets. Did the dispersion of capital good prices, and ultimately the user cost of capital, follow the same pattern? Table 3 reports the coefficient of variation of relative capital goods and equipment prices from 1875 to 1990, both with and without Japan,12 and in many ways the time path of the capital goods price dispersion is quite different from that of real interest rates.13 Obstfeld and Taylor find that the dispersion of real interest rates in the 1950s was larger than in the 1870s and 1880s. But even when Japan is excluded from the samples, the dispersion of both relative capital goods prices and relative equipment prices were about half as large in 1950 as in 1870: excluding Japan, the epochs of big decline in the dispersion of capital goods prices are 1885-1895, 1945-1950, and 1965-1985 . It could be that our measure of relative capital price dispersion becomes less reliable the further we travel from the benchmark year, so what happens when we chop off some of the more distant 19th century decades? Obstfeld and Taylor find that the dispersion of interest rates was Obstfeld and Taylor's sample includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States.
12 The magnitude of the relative price change in Japan tends to dominate the change in the overall dispersion, and so we calculate the dispersion statistics both with and without Japan to provide a clearer picture of the Atlantic economy's experience. Yet, no matter how global capital goods market integration is calculated in Table 3 , there is clear evidence of an unambiguous decline in price dispersion over the century or so between 1875 and today.
13 Our sample is somewhat different from that of Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) , and our measure of dispersion is different as well. Obstfeld and Taylor measure the dispersion as the standard deviation of the absolute interest rate differential relative to the US. (Obstfeld and Taylor 1998) , and they both might be related to the breakdown in global markets, one in the goods market and one in the financial market.
An important distinction between our version of global capital market integration and that of the financial historian emerges from Table 3 . The widening in the dispersion of real interest rates (Obstfeld and Taylor 1998, Figure 11. 3) took place during wartime and interwar episodes which were associated with government interventions that destroyed well-integrated global financial markets. That is, policy had a clear 14 One could take the view that a decline in the price dispersion does not necessarily imply that market integration has increased if declining transport costs are doing all the work rather than the appearance of better institutions and more liberal policy. Clearly, one's definition of integration matters to one's interpretation of the evidence. However, there should be no debate about epochs of integration.
These comparisons are inexact because some countries leave the sample during the wars. However, we constructed coefficient of variation time series for samples that always exclude these subsets of countries and found that the rise in the dispersion is not merely the result of these countries leaving the sample.
impact on the functioning of global financial markets. In capital goods markets, however, it appears that the globalization backlash during the interwar years had very little to do with the evolution of relative capital goods prices. The years 19 10-1940 show very little change in the dispersion of relative capital goods prices; in fact, these years show a decline in the dispersion of relative equipment prices.
This strikes us as an important finding. While government intervention had a predictable impact in first destroying and then reconstructing global financial capital markets, it did not have the same impact on relative capital goods prices. If changes in capital goods prices dominated changes in the user cost of capital, then we have a revisionist finding of some note and the literature on financial history can be said to have missed a crucial point. Tables 4a and 4b make an effort to identify changes in the two components of the user cost of capital over time (Table 4a ) and differences across countries (Table 4b ).'6 In Table 4a for the period 1870-1914, there are six countries for which the data can say something about the components of user costs. Both components of the user cost of capital fell in the United Kingdom, and so the observed decline in the interest rate understates the decline in the user cost of capital, the latter nearly twice the former. In the other five cases, the fall in one component of the user cost was at least partially offset by a rise in the other. The relatively large changes in the (i + ô -Pk/Pk) component of user costs reflects the relatively large swings in nominal interest rates and inflation rates compared to changes in the relative cost of capital to consumer goods. For the period 19 10-1949 there are eight countries for which the data can say something about user costs. Changes in the components of the user cost reinforce one another in Australia, Canada, Italy and Sweden, but move in opposite directions in Germany, Norway, the UK, and the US. The rise in relative capital goods prices more than offsets the fall in (i + ô -Pk!Pk) for Germany and very nearly so for Norway.
The offsetting effect of the relative price of capital goods was more modest but not insignificant for the UK 16 To facilitate the calculation of percentage changes in the (i +ô -Pk/Pk) component of user costs, we simply assume that ô = 0.10 for all countries and periods. and the US. Table 4b measures at various points in time differences across countries in the two components of the user cost of capital (all expressed relative to the US). In the 1870s, the US appears to have had a relatively high effective interest rate, but a relatively low relative price of capital goods. Thus, the high financial cost of capital in the US was partially offset by the relatively low cost of the capital goods being purchased. Note that the total user cost of capital appears to have been very similar in the US and UK in the 1 870s despite the US having relatively high interest rates, a revisionist finding given the established tradition which characterizes the US as capital-scarce compared to Britain at that time. As pointed out in the discussion of Table 2a , the US maintained this relatively low price of capital goods throughout the period under consideration, and by the late 1 940s, it also had a relatively low real interest rate. Low interest rates and cheap capital goods imply low user costs of capital, and that fact should have made investment in the US very attractive.
Capital Goods Prices, Investment and Growth
The relative price of capital goods has been featured prominently in a number of recent cross-section studies of economic growth (Dc Long and Summers 1991; Easterly 1993; Jones 1994; Lee 1995; Greenwood, Hercowitz, Krusell 1997; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1998) . Charles Jones, for example, uses data underlying the Penn World Tables to argue that "an increase in the relative price of machinery reduces capital accumulation and therefore reduces the growth rate of the economy" (Jones 1994, p. 372) . But have capital goods prices always had this influence on investment and growth, or is it only a late 20th century phenomenon? We will use the capital goods relative price data 1870-1950 to test the durability of this link.
The effect of capital goods prices on growth is indirect, while its effect on accumulation is direct.
Thus, we should find more convincing evidence of the importance of relative capital goods prices by focusing first on the quantity of investment undertaken. An empirical assessment of the link between capital goods prices and investment rates is offered in Tables 5 and 6 . Each observation in the regression represents a particular country over one of the following six periods: 1870-85, 1885-1900, 1900-13, 1913-29, 1929-39, and 1939-50 . Across columns, the sample size changes depending on the availability of data.18 The investment share in GDP is regressed on the log of GDP per capita, the relative price of capital goods (or machinery), and the real interest rate on long term assets at the beginning of each period.19 We also include time period dummies. Table 5 calculates the investment share in current prices whereas Table 6 calculates it in constant prices.20
The relative price of capital goods is not exogenous, and so this kind of estimation procedure does not offer a clean identification of the effect of relative capital goods prices on investment and accumulation, an issue we will consider in the next section. Non-price forces which shift the demand curve for investment goods to the right will also raise the relative price of capital goods, a fact which will be true even for tradable equipment if the investment boom is world-wide. This will tend to generate a positive relationship between investment rates and relative capital goods prices, and thus a downward bias on the true influence of capital goods prices on accumulation and growth. The same will be true for real interest rates. We attempt to minimize this bias by observing prices and interest rates at the beginning of the period rather than in the middle, as would be implied by an average over the period. Furthermore, the specification fails to introduce For example, of the eleven countries which have sufficient national accounts for the construction of relative capital goods price series, real interest rate data exist only for seven (Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and the United States).
19 The real interest rate figures are derived from unpublished data supplied by Michael Bordo and Alan Taylor. Of course, cross-country comparisons of such rates are necessarily inexact.
20 The constant price investment and GDP series from each country are used to form a series representing the constant price investment share over time, and then intemationally comparable figures for investment and GDP from the PWT for 1950 are used to benchmark each country's constant price investment share in that year. demographic variables (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Williamson 1998) , measures of protection (O'Rourke 1997a), economic geography (Krugman 1991; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1998) and other variables that have been shown to influence growth and ought to affect investment and accumulation as well. Nevertheless, we press bravely ahead with the simple OLS specification, expecting to improve it in future versions of this paper.
The correlation of the investment rate with capital goods or equipment prices is in all cases negative and in all cases but one statistically significant. According to Table 6 , column 1, a one-standard-deviation increase in the relative price of capital goods is associated with a decline in the investment share of about 3.6 percentage points, a significant figure in an era when the investment rate was around 17 percent, and it implies an elasticity of -0.68. According to column 2, a one standard deviation increase in the relative price of equipment is associated with a decline in the (total) investment share of 3.4 percentage points (an elasticity of -0.45). If in 1870 the US had had the relative price of capital goods of the other countries (not including Japan), the regression suggests that the US investment share would have been about 2.4 percentage points lower than it was between 1870 and 1885. Since the US always had cheap capital goods, one may conclude that its investment rate, its rate of accumulation, and ultimately its rate of growth were always favored by this characteristic of its price structure. Thus, we have found that relative capital goods prices were an important determinant of investment, and, by extension, that they were also important to growth.
Columns 3 and 4 add the real interest rate at each period's beginning to the regressions.2' This changes the sample composition considerably because interest rate data are not available for every country.
The real interest rate is negatively related to investment rate, but the coefficient estimate is very imprecise. This might be due to demand side forces that tend to raise investment and interest rates simultaneously or to problems with the intemational comparability of the interest rates, or both.
2! The real interest rate is calculated as the difference between the nominal interest rate and in the inflation rate for all goods.
So far, we have suggested that because capital goods prices appear to affect investment, they must also affect growth. Table 7 looks for direct evidence of this link between capital goods prices and growth. In the manner of Robert Barro (1991) , we regress average annual per capita GDP growth over each period on the log of GDP per capita, the relative price of capital goods (or machinery), and time period dummies. As with the investment equations, this version of the paper excludes from the growth equation other conditioning variables like geography, demography, and policy. Both columns in Table 7 yield the expected negative coefficient on initial GDP per capita, that is, poor countries grow faster than rich, ceteris paribus. Most importantly for the theme of this paper, the relative price of capital goods (or machinery) has a consistent negative impact on growth. True, the estimate for total capital goods prices is far from statistically significant, but this is hardly surprising given the confounding demand side effects on the relative price of capital goods, the limited number of conditioning variables present in the specification, and the indirect nature of the link between capital goods price and growth. Previous studies of international income convergence have found that the United States' growth rate outpaced the predictions of convergence regressions estimated with long run data (Wright 1990; Williamson 1996) . The US was a rich country which continued to grow quickly relative to the rest of the world despite the implications of neoclassical convergence models. We have now identified one reason why: the US was favored by cheap capital goods throughout the period.
Explaining the Relative Price of Capital Goods
Thus far, capital goods prices have been taken as given and used as if they were exogenous in the growth and investment regressions reported above. Now we consider some of the factors that might explain differences in relative capital goods prices across countries and their changes over time. After discussing Japan and the United States in some detail, we explore the determinants of the relative price of capital goods 22 Unlike the previous growth regressions this one does not break up each country's performance into six periods, rather the dependent variable is average annual growth over the full 80 years and the independent variables are initial GDP per capita and initial relative price of capital goods. The coefficient on the relative price variable is 0.00003 18 (t-statistic = 4.97). Similar counterfactual results are attained if Japan is excluded from the regression and from the calculation of the average price of capital in countries other than the US. econometrically. Tables 2a and 2b is the high ratio of capital goods prices to consumer goods prices in Japan, especially in the 1 870s and 18 80s and especially for producer durables. The small size of the domestic machine tool industry at the time of the Meiji Restoration, and its evolution thereafter, is discussed at length by Toshiaki Chokki (1986) . Imported machines were crucial to the establishment of Japanese arsenals in the 1 870s, and subsequently the process of military modernization appears to have provided an important impetus to the development of domestic machine production (Yamamura 1977) . During World War I, domestic production of machinery expanded rapidly to fill the growing demand which (for the time being) could not be satisfied by imports from Britain, the US, or Germany. Tables la through 2b all show that the relative price of capital goods rose substantially in Japan during these years reflecting the increase in domestic demand coupled with an inelastic wartime import supply. Imports bounced back after the war, however, and the relative price of capital goods fell. The invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the years of war that followed again cut off foreign supplies of machinery, and it is reflected in the rise of the relative price of machinery.
One of the outstanding characteristics of
These temporary shocks drove the expansion and evolution of the domestic capital goods industry and in doing so may have contributed to the long-run permanent decline in Japanese capital goods prices.
When looking at United States 19th century experience, Nathan Rosenberg (1 963b, p. 223) linked the emergence and development of the domestic capital goods industry with the size of the market for such goods. He argued that "with the growth in the demand for machinery the capital-goods industry became gradually more and more highly specialized and subdivided in order to undertake the production of machines, the cost of producing machines was thereby sharply reduced. . ." Presumably, the Rosenberg hypothesis is more likely to survive the more is machinery non-tradable. With the hypothesis in mind, we will test econometrically whether the size of the domestic economy, ceteris paribus, had a noticeable impact on the relative price of capital goods between 1870 and 1950.
When studying l9 century American capital accumulation, Jeffrey Williamson (1979) argued that it was important to distinguish between those capital goods which were labor-intensive, non-tradable and undergoing slow rates of productivity advance (structures and infrastructure) and those capital goods which were skill-intensive, tradable and undergoing fast rates of productivity growth (equipment and machinery).
Given those attributes, we would expect the relative price of machines to decline faster than the price of structures and thus of all capital goods combined, as Tables 1 a and lb confirm. American economic historians have always argued that the rate of productivity advance in the producer durables sector was relatively fast (Rosenberg 1963a (Rosenberg , 1963b (Rosenberg , 1969 David 1975; Williamson 1979) . If what was true of the US was also true at the global level, then we should see a declining price of producers durables relative to consumer goods world-wide, and in fact this is also confirmed in Table lb . Furthermore, in a world of imperfect commodity market integration, we would expect the relative price of capital goods to be higher in poor agrarian countries which have not yet experienced the unbalanced productivity growth associated with industrialization. Williamson (1974 Williamson ( , 1979 also argued that part of the decline in the US relative price of capital goods between the 1 840s and the 1 870s was due to Civil War tariffs that raised the price of manufactured goods relative to investment goods, tariffs which persisted for almost a century after the Civil War ended. It may appear that Argentine import substitution experience in the 1940s and 1950s is inconsistent with the American Civil War tariff experience almost a century earlier, the former contributing to slow growth and the latter to fast growth. The inconsistency is resolved, however, if capital goods in the 1 6Os were for the most part nontradable structures and homemade machines, while over the course of the next century, the tradable machine component became much more important. In the American case, tariffs would have decreased the relative price of then nontradable capital goods, while in the Argentine case they would have increased the relative price of now tradable (and imported) capital goods.
On the other hand, US demand shifted away from structures and infrastructure and towards machines as settlement and town-building slowed down, and as agriculture contracted (relatively) while manufacturing expanded (Kuznets 1961: p. 40) . These events should have contributed to the shift in capital from structures to equipment, thus raising the relative price of equipment from the demand side. In the long run, however, these demand forces should have been overwhelmed by changing cost conditions on the supply side.
Endowments of labor and skills may also matter to the relative price of capital goods. The construction of structures is very labor intensive, while the construction of machines is very skill intensive. In countries and epochs where labor is cheap and skills are expensive, and where world commodity markets are only imperfectly integrated, the relative price of machines should be high. In countries and epochs where labor is expensive and skills are cheap, the relative price of machines should be low. In the Anglo-American debate over ante bellum dual scarcity, it emerged that the relative price of skills and machines were low in America (Rosenberg 1967; Brito and Williamson 1973) . More generally, this fact offers another reason to expect a positive correlation between level of development and cheap capital goods.
We explore these hypotheses econometrically in Table 8 where the log relative capital goods price (or equipment price) is regressed on the log of initial GDP per capita, the log of total GDP, and a measure of tariff rates. There are three key findings reported there. First, GDP per capita has a negative impact on the relative price of capital goods (especially equipment), a result Charles Jones (1994) also reports for the late 20th century. This finding is consistent with our discussion of unbalanced factor productivity growth as well as with the suggestion that rich countries with relatively abundant skills will also be characterized by relatively cheap capital goods. Furthennore, the coefficient on GDP per capita is larger and more significant for equipment than for all capital goods, just as we would have predicted. Second, columns 2 and 5 show that for a given level of GDP per capita, the overall size of the domestic economy is positively, not negatively, correlated with relative capital goods prices, a clear rejection of the Rosenberg hypothesis. This suggests that cost reductions due to scale were more far important for consumption goods than for capital goods. Third, higher tariffs were associated with lower relative capital goods prices. In colunm 3 a 10 percentage point increase in the tariff rate (say, from 0.10 to 0.20) lowers the relative price of capital goods by 7.6 percent, and in column 6 a 10 percentage point increase in the tariff rate lowers the relative price of equipment by 25.6 percent. To the extent that tariffs distorted prices prior to 1950, they did so in a way that lowered the price of capital goods relative to consumer goods, a price twist consistent with what Williamson (1974 Williamson ( , 1977 has argued for US Civil War tariffs. The fact that tariffs appear to be negatively associated with capital goods prices might help explain the otherwise puzzling positive correlation between late 19th century growth and tariffs, the "Bairoch effect" (Bairoch 1989 ) recently confirmed by 0 'Rourke (1 997b).23
The Relative Price of Men and Machines
The price of capital goods is most often expressed relative to the price of other goods, but capital goods are, after all, factors of production too, and so it may be useful to compare the price of capital goods with the price of another factor of production, unskilled labor. Table 9 reports five-year averages of the price of capital goods relative to the price of labor for ten countries between 1870 and 1950. Every country experienced a rise in the price of men relative to the capital goods with which they worked between 1870 and 1914. Alternatively, the price of capital goods fell relative to the unskilled worker's wage, and the decline in Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Nonvay was especially large. The wage gains driven by mass European emigration would help account for the fact that the downward trend was more dramatic in Europe than in the New World. The US, Canada, and Australia all underwent comparatively small declines in the Pk/W ratio up to 1914, and Japan's ratio increased substantially before declining after 1890. After 1915, and with the end of mass migration, there was a regime switch: the US and Canada now joined Italy, Japan, Norway and 23 We call this 19th century growth-tariff or growth-openness positive correlation puzzling since it is negative for the late 20th century (Sachs and Warner 1995; Vamvakidis 1997) . For the equipment price, the coefficient on the tariff variable remains negative and statistically significant even when the US (a high tariff, low PkIPc country) is omitted from the regression. The tariff coefficient becomes positive but statistically insignificant in the regression with all capital goods prices when the US is omitted.
Sweden in recording substantial declines in the Pk/W ratio. Over the full 80 year period, only Australia had no lasting decline in its Pk/W ratio.
International comparisons of the capital goods price/wage ratio can be made by using price data from the PWT and internationally comparable wage data from Williamson (1995) to form a benchmark in 1950.24
The series underlying Table 9 can then be used to extend the international comparisons back to 1870 as we do in Table 10 . In the benchmark year of 1950, the US had the lowest Pk/W ratio by far, and it appears to have held that position throughout the period under consideration (though Norway occasionally challenged).
Denmark, Sweden, and Italy had the highest ratios in 1870, but all three experienced a rapid decline in Pk,'W over the subsequent 80 years.
The Agenda
The user cost of capital has two components, the cost of finance and the cost of the capital good.
Thus, any attempt to understand the integration and disintegration of world capital markets over time should pay attention to both components. The same should be true of any comparative assessment across epochs or across countries of investment behavior, accumulation performance and growth. Oddly enough, however, the relative price of capital goods has not been incorporated into studies of capital market integration and longterm growth. To rectify this omission, we developed a panel data base for eleven OECD countries over the eight decades between 1870 and 1950.
While this paper must be viewed as only a start on a long term historical assessment of these issues, and while the underlying capital goods price data base is fragile, some stylized facts seem to be robust. First, 24 The benchmark relies on the ratio of PkIPc from the PWT to the real wage from Williamson (1995) where both PkIPc and the real wage are expressed relative to the US in 1950. The series are extended back from this benchmark on the basis of changes in the nominal price of capital goods relative to nominal wages within each country.
there was enormous variance in trends in the relative price of capital goods across countries before 1950. Some, like Japan, underwent a spectacular decline in the aggregate capital goods price from 1870 to 1914, while others, like Scandinavia, underwent a rise. This divergence was possible even during a period of globalization in trade since only equipment was traded, while structures, of course, were not. Second, the relative price of equipment fell everywhere, an event which appears to support the view that productivity growth was faster in the producer goods sector world-wide. Yet, and third, there was a notable regime switch around World War I, after which the downward drift in the relative price of equipment stopped and in some cases reversed. Finally, there was also enormous variance in the relative price of capital goods and the user cost of capital across countries. Some, like Japan and Sweden, were disadvantaged by relatively expensive capital goods, and thus needed higher savings rates to achieve the same growth as their competitors. Some, like Germany and the United States, were favored by relatively cheap capital goods, and thus could achieve the same rates of growth with lower savings rates. Do these capital goods price facts change our conventional views of the evolution of a global capital market? They do indeed. Using the more comprehensive user cost criteria, capital markets were far better integrated in the 1980s than they were in the 1890s, not equally well-integrated as the financial historian usually argues. Furthermore, the time path of the capital goods price dispersion is very different than that of real interest rates, and thus will require different explanations. The dispersion of real interest rates increases between 1910 and 1940, decades which were associated with government interventions that destroyed wellintegrated world financial markets. Yet, globalization backlash after 1914 seems to have had very little to do with the evolution of capital goods prices.
The remainder of the paper takes a stab at three difficult questions: First, did the relative price of capital goods have a statistically significant and big impact on investment? The answer is yes: expensive capital goods choked off investment. The impact was statistically significant and powerful, so that on average the investment share responded to the relative price of capital goods with an elasticity of about -0.7.
Did the relative price of capital goods also have a statistically significant and big impact on GDP per capita growth? Here the answer is more tentative. Yes, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita was dampened by high capital goods prices with an elasticity of almost -0.6. But significance tests suggest that caution be attached to that conclusion, perhaps confirming that while the impact of capital goods prices on investment and accumulation was direct, its impact on growth was indirect. Finally, what explains the relative price of capital goods? Here we find that prior to 1950 rich countries had lower relative capital goods prices compared with poor countries, large economies had higher relative prices compared with small ones (holding constant GDP per capita), and economies with tariffs had lower relative prices compared with those which went for free trade.
The agenda for future research has four parts. First, we would like to extend and improve the capital goods price data base. Second, the investment and growth equations must be augmented by more conditional variables to better isolate the impact of capital goods prices. Third, while we know that capital deepening raises the relative price of labor and lowers the relative price of machines, we need to learn more about the causal direction that goes from the relative price of labor or machines to capital deepening. History shows that countries trace out very different trends in the relative price of men versus machines, and we need to know the reasons why. Fourth, the determinants of the price of capital goods relative to consumption goods must be better understood. This last agenda item is especially important since only by so doing can we isolate the roles of policy and institutions in accounting for the evolution of world capital markets and their impact. 1915-19 1920-24 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39 1940-44 1945-49 1950 Table 5 notes. Sources: Growth rates over each period and initial GDP per capita are from Maddison (1995) . Maddison (1995) . The tariff data are used in Collins, O'Rourke, and Williamson (1997) . 
